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      PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-2733 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL S. TORRE; GERALDINE A. TORRE,  
 Appellants 
 
v. 
 
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;  
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 
(FEMA) 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-13-cv-06665) 
District Judge:  Honorable Anne E. Thompson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 25, 2015 
 
Before:  AMBRO, VANASKIE and SLOVITER,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 26, 2015) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael S. Torre and Geraldine A. Torre appeal from 
the order of the District Court entering summary judgment in 
favor of Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company  
(“Liberty”).  We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 The Torres (husband and wife) own land and a house 
at 1234 Ocean Avenue in Mantoloking, New Jersey.  They 
also hold a National Flood Insurance Program Dwelling Form 
Standard Flood Insurance Policy (“SFIP”) issued by Liberty 
under the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.  The Act 
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established the National Flood Insurance Program, which “is 
underwritten by the United States Treasury in order to 
provide flood insurance below actuarial rates.”  Suopys v. 
Omaha Prop. & Cas., 404 F.3d 805, 807 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
terms of the SFIP are prescribed by regulation and set forth at 
44 C.F.R. pt. 61, App. A(1).  Id. at 807.   
 
 The Torres’ property sustained substantial damage 
during Hurricane Sandy, and they submitted claims under the 
SFIP for that damage to Liberty.  This dispute concerns 
coverage for the cost of removing storm-generated debris not 
owned by the Torres from portions of their land.  Liberty 
administered a total payment1 to the Torres of $235,751.68, 
which included the cost of removing debris from their house.  
The Torres sought an additional payment of $15,520 for the 
cost of removing sand and other debris deposited on their 
land in front of and behind their house.2  Liberty denied that 
claim on the ground that the SFIP does not cover it.   
                                              
1 As Liberty notes, it does not make payments under the SFIP.  
Liberty instead merely administers the federal program, and 
“[i]t is the Government, not the [insurance] companies, that 
pays the claims.”  C.E.R. 1988, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 
386 F.3d 263, 267 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
2 The Torres argue that their claim also included the cost of 
removing debris from their garage, and they now dispute 
Liberty’s assertion that it paid that cost.  The Torres have 
waived this claim for the reasons explained in note 7 below.  
Thus, our discussion will focus solely on the removal of 
debris from the Torres’ land outside their house. 
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 The Torres then filed suit against Liberty in New 
Jersey state court seeking payment of the $15,520, and 
Liberty removed the suit to federal court.  The Torres 
thereafter filed an amended complaint asserting a claim 
against the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(“FEMA”) as well, but they voluntarily withdrew that claim.  
The parties ultimately filed motions for summary judgment 
after agreeing that there were no material facts in dispute 
because the sole issue before the District Court was one of 
contractual interpretation.  The District Court denied the 
Torres’ motion, granted Liberty’s motion, and entered 
judgment in Liberty’s favor.  The Torres appeal.3 
 
II. 
 The sole issue on appeal is whether the SFIP covers 
expenses for removing debris not owned by the Torres from 
their land outside their house.  The debris-removal provision 
states that “[w]e will pay the expense to remove non-owned 
debris that is on or in insured property and debris of insured 
property anywhere.”  44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. A(1), Art. 
III(C)(1)(a) (2009) (emphasis added).4  This appeal turns on 
the meaning of the term “insured property.”  The Torres argue 
that “insured property” means not only the specific structures 
and items of property that are insured by the SFIP (such as 
their house) but their entire parcel of land.  Liberty, by 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 4053, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review 
of the entry of summary judgment is plenary.  See Suopys, 
404 F.3d at 809. 
 
4 All citations to the SFIP herein are to 44 C.F.R. Pt. 61, App. 
A(1). 
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contrast, argues that “insured property” means only the 
property insured under the SFIP and that the SFIP does not 
cover land. 
 
 The SFIP does not define the term “insured property,” 
so we must interpret that term as it appears in the SFIP’s 
debris-removal provision.  We appear to be the first Court of 
Appeals to do so.  Cf. Dickson v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of 
Fla., 739 F.3d 397, 399, 401 (8th Cir. 2014) (not reaching the 
issue).  “It is well settled that federal common law governs 
the interpretation of the SFIP at issue here.”  Linder & 
Assocs. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 166 F.3d 547, 550 (3d Cir. 
1999).  Thus, “[w]e utilize standard insurance law principles 
to construe the SFIP.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  “Under 
these principles, we interpret the SFIP in accordance with its 
plain, unambiguous meaning.”  Id.  If the SFIP is ambiguous 
and reasonably “susceptible to two constructions, however, 
we will adopt the one more favorable to the insured.”  Id.  
Having applied these principles, it is clear that Liberty’s 
interpretation of “insured property” is the only reasonable one 
when viewed in light of the SFIP as a whole.   
 
 We begin with the common-sense observation that the 
term “insured property” means property that is insured.  Not 
surprisingly, that is FEMA’s understanding of the term as 
well.5  The SFIP specifies in great detail which items of 
                                              
5 FEMA’s Flood Adjuster’s Claims Manual, which is 
“incorporated by reference into the FEMA regulations,” 
Suopys, 404 F.3d at 811 (citing 44 C.F.R. § 62.23), explains 
with regard to debris removal that “[i]nsured property means 
property we insure—i.e., the described building and covered 
contents.”   FEMA Claims Adjuster Manual V-15 (2010). 
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property it covers and which it does not.  Article III(A), titled 
“Coverage A—Building Property,” provides coverage for 
damage to a dwelling and other specified structures as well as 
various items of property associated with those structures.  
Article III(C), titled “Coverage C—Other Coverages,” 
provides coverage for certain other kinds of losses and 
includes the debris-removal provision at issue here.  (The 
SFIP also provides other forms of coverage in Articles III(B) 
and III(D), but they are not currently relevant.)  Conversely, 
Article IV is titled “Property Not Covered” and specifies what 
property the SFIP does not insure.  Article IV specifies that 
“[w]e do not cover . . . “[l]and, land values, lawns, trees, 
shrubs, plants, [or] growing crops.”  Art. IV(6) (emphasis 
added).  Article IV also specifies that the SFIP does not 
cover, inter alia, “[f]ences, retaining walls, seawalls, [or] 
bulkheads,” Art. IV(12), or “[t]hose portions of walks, 
walkways, decks, driveways, patios and other surfaces . . . 
located outside the perimeter, exterior walls of the insured 
building.” Art. IV(9). 
 
 In sum, the SFIP provides coverage for certain 
structures and other items of property but not for an entire 
parcel of land.  The entire parcel of land thus cannot 
constitute “insured property” because it is not insured by the 
SFIP at all.  And because the entire parcel of land does not 
constitute “insured property,” the provision of the SFIP 
requiring Liberty to pay for the removal of non-owned debris 
that is “on or in insured property” does not apply to the 
expenses the Torres incurred in removing non-owned  
debris from their land outside their home.  Art. III(C)(1)(a). 
 
 The Torres raise essentially four arguments in an effort 
to avoid this rather obvious result.  We disagree with each.  
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First, they argue that the term “property” should be given its 
ordinary meaning and that its ordinary meaning includes land.  
They further argue that term “insured property” refers to their 
land at 1234 Ocean Avenue in its entirety because that is the 
property listed on the Declarations Page and thus is the 
“property” that is insured.  The Declarations Page is indeed 
part of the SFIP, see Art. II(B)(10), and the SFIP refers to the 
location “shown on the Declarations Page” as the “described 
location,” Art. II(B)(11).  The SFIP, however, expressly 
distinguishes between the “described location” and the 
“insured property.”  See, e.g., Art. V(A)(2), (3) (providing 
that “we do not pay you for . . . [l]oss of access to the insured 
property or described location” or “[l]oss of use of the insured 
property or described location”) (emphasis added).  If the 
meaning of “insured property” were coextensive with the 
“described location”—i.e., the location “shown on the 
Declarations Page”—then there would be no need to 
distinguish the two.  The SFIP, however, does precisely that.  
 
 Second, the Torres argue that the debris-removal 
provision cannot be limited to debris removed from a building 
because, if it were, it would be contained in the article 
specifically governing buildings (i.e., “Coverage A—
Building Property”) instead of the article governing “other 
coverages.”  In so contending, the Torres misunderstand the 
structure of the SFIB, which is organized by type of coverage 
rather than type of insured property.  Coverage A addresses 
the coverage provided for “direct physical loss by or from 
flood,” Art. III(A), which is defined as “[l]oss or damage to 
insured property, directly caused by a flood.  There must be 
evidence of physical changes to the property.”  Art. II(B)(12).  
The cost of removing debris does not constitute that kind of 
loss, and it is thus logical that it should be addressed in a 
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different article.  Moreover, it is conceivable that non-owned 
debris could be in or on property insured under Coverage B 
(personal property) but not Coverage A, particularly if the 
debris is found in or on personal property that is in turn inside 
a fully constructed “building” that is neither a “dwelling” nor 
a “garage.”  (This result follows from the fact that Article IV 
exempts from coverage personal property not in a building, 
but Coverage A extends only to dwellings, garages, and 
buildings under construction.  See Art. IV(1), Art. III(A)(1), 
(3), (5).) 
 
 Third, the Torres argue that the debris-removal 
provision would be superfluous if limited to the removal of 
non-owned debris from a building because coverage for such 
removal already is provided by the “clean-up” provision of 
Article III(A)(8)(b).  But Article III(A)(8)(b) only covers 
clean-up associated with ‘[i]tems of property in a building 
enclosure below the lowest elevated floor of [certain 
buildings in enumerated places], or in a basement.’  Art. 
III(A)(8).  The SFIP does not define “clean-up,” but whatever 
its precise meaning it refers only to clean-up associated with 
specific items of property contained in a specific area of a 
building.  Thus, the provision does not cover the removal of 
non-owned debris from a building as a whole.  Such removal 
is covered instead by the debris-removal provision at issue 
here. 
 
   Finally, the Torres assert that interpreting “insured 
property” to mean both buildings and the land is consistent 
with the purpose of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
to “protect real property which includes the land and any 
structure erected on the land.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 13) (citing 
42 U.S.C. § 4011(a).)  The Torres have not developed any 
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meaningful argument in this regard, but their assertion cannot 
be squared with the fact that the SFIP has long provided that 
it does not cover land.  See Art. IV(6).6  There is no reason to 
believe that the provision covering the removal of non-owned 
debris from “insured property” covers the removal of debris 
from the land when the SFIP expressly disclaims coverage of 
the land itself.7 
                                              
6 The Torres have not argued that the SFIP promulgated by 
FEMA is inconsistent in this respect with any statute enacted 
by Congress.  We thus do not address that issue, though in so 
noting we do not suggest that there may be any viable 
argument in that regard. 
 
7 In addition to their arguments regarding the SFIP, the Torres 
argue that Liberty failed to pay the cost of removing debris 
from their garage and that their garage is “insured property” 
because it is covered by Coverage A.  In that regard, they 
dispute Liberty’s assertion that it paid $5,179.34 for that 
purpose and argue that the District Court should have decided 
what portion of their claim concerns debris removed from the 
garage.  As Liberty argues, the Torres have waived this claim.  
They concede in their brief that “both parties agreed [before 
the District Court] that there was no question of fact to be 
resolved.”  (Appellants’ Br. at 4.)  Indeed, at the outset of 
their certification in opposition to Liberty’s motion for 
summary judgment, the Torres argued that “[i]t is clear that 
the sole issue before the Court is the meaning of” the debris-
removal provision.  (ECF No. 18 at 1 ¶ 2.)  Moreover, after 
Liberty asserted in its statement of uncontested facts that it 
paid for “removal of debris from the garage” (ECF No. 17-2 ¶ 
10) and provided evidentiary support (ECF No. 17-4 at 4 ¶ 
13), the Torres presented no evidence to the contrary and did 
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 In sum, we conclude that the term “insured property” 
clearly and unambiguously means property that is insured 
under the SFIP, that land is not insured under the SFIP, and 
that the SFIP thus does not cover costs the Torres incurred in 
removing debris not owned by them from their land outside 
their home.8 
                                                                                                     
not otherwise specifically dispute this point (ECF No. 18 at 3 
¶¶ 7 & 8). 
   
8 Our conclusion is supported by the only decision that the 
parties have cited in which another court has addressed a 
similar claim.  See Keating v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 
No. 01-5057, 2002 WL 32348340 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2002).  
In that case, the insureds sought coverage under a former 
version of the SFIP for, inter alia, costs to facilitate the 
removal of “all debris due to flooding waters” on their land.  
Id. at *1.  The Court dismissed their complaint and concluded 
that:  “When read in its entire context . . . the terms of the 
contract are clear and unambiguous that coverage is for the 
building only, and that [non-owned] debris removal is 
covered only if the debris is in or on the building.”  Id. at *3.  
The debris-removal provision at issue here is worded 
differently, but the differences are not material.  See National 
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP); Insurance Coverage and 
Rates, 65 Fed. Reg. 60758, 60760 (Oct. 12, 2000) (noting that 
linguistic revisions “simplif[ied] the debris removal 
provisions”).  We have located only one other decision that 
addresses the debris-removal provision.  See Dickson v. Am. 
Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 1:12-cv-022, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 183163 (D.N.D. Mar. 18, 2013), rev’d on other 
grounds, 739 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2014).  In that case, the Court 
concluded that the provision does indeed cover the removal of 
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III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.  The Torres’ motion to strike Liberty’s 
brief for untimely service is denied. 
                                                                                                     
non-owned debris from the land.  See id. at *18-22.  The 
Court in Dickson did not address Keating, however, and it 
provided very little reasoning and no legal support for its 
conclusion.  For these reasons and those explained above, 
Dickson is not persuasive on this point. 
